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He then went on, via the Kuria Muria islands, to Muscat. It was, so he reported, a month by camel across the desert from Aden to Dhofar. Just over a century ago, in January ,Theodore and Mabel Bent set out to go by land from Dhofar to Hadhramaut: they did not, as we know, succeed. I can claim to have walked across the frontier, from Hauf to Rakhyut, during the Dhofar war, and I suspect many others, in both directions, did so as well.
I was struck making part of this trip recently by jeep, just how demanding it had been. But with the completion of this road, both a reality and symbol of the new cooperation, the linking of Muscat to Aden, and on to Sanaa, will now become a reality, one which, I hope, we may all, under appropriate circumstances, be able to enjoy. In assessing this relationship I would like to look first at the development of relations between the two states, how the two states got to their present understanding, then at recent agreements, before, by way of conclusion, examining some of the issues which they may have to face, conjointly, in the future.
The story of their origins tells us that Yemen and Oman sprang from a similar source, the original inhabitants of Oman having migrated fromYemen after, so legend has it, the bursting of the dam at Marib. This is the story told in the famous history of al-Kalbi, of the migration of Malik bin Falim with 6, followers via Hadhramaut: after defeating a Persian army near Nizwa, he established the first independent state in Oman.
Certainly, well before the sixth century there were trade links between what is today Oman and Yemen, most notably through the frankincense trade from Dhofar, but more generally as well. The first Islamic states ofYemen and Oman therefore evolved quite separately, and there seems to have been little contact between them; but it is believed by many that the first Imam in Oman only emerged after the institution of the same name had collapsed in Yemen. The history from then to the seventeenth century, when the beginnings of the modern states began to emerge, is unclear: it certainly seems, however, that the boundaries between the two states were not fixed, and interaction, sometimes confrontation, was recurrent.
On the other hand, there are reports in Omani history, though not in Yemeni sources, of the Omani incorporation of Hadhramaut, during a revolt in the tenth and eleventh centuries against Yemeni rule. In this mediaeval period, the frontier of state, economy, culture was certainly not firm nor should we expect it to have been. It testifies to the continued interaction of the two states and to that fluidity of culture and allegiance that prevailed in the large intermediate space between the coreYemeni and Omani domains.
The origins of the modern relationship are to be found in two overlapping processes — the gradual emergence, from the sixteenth century onwards, of distinct states inYemen and Oman, the Qasimis and theYaariba respectively, and the interaction of these states with foreign powers, in both cases with Britain and in the Omani case with Iran, and in the Yemeni with Turkey.
To this process of state formation and external interaction was added the development internal to the Peninsula itself, the rise of the Wahhabi movement and, ultimately, the creation of Saudi Arabia. What this meant in practice was that by the end of the nineteenth century the SouthYemeni and Omani states had been placed under varying forms of British control. This led in one sense to a delineation of the boundary between them: the Omani incorporation of Dhofar in , and the signing by Britain of Protectorate Agreements with the ruler of the adjoining area of Mahra, the Sultan of Qishn and Socotra in and , and meant that the area as a whole came under loose British protection.
Yet the very fact that strategic control lay with an external power may have lessened contact between the two states. The result was, by the beginning of the twentieth century, the retreat of both Yemen and Oman into a form of insulation from which they only later emerged. The exception was, of course, Aden and, in a different way, Hadhramaut: they looked to the world beyond the region and less to other Arabian states or societies.
The insulation ofYemen from Oman was, however, never complete. As this coincided with the Omani expansion into Dhofar there was concern that Omani influence could spread westwards: the UK government therefore discouraged any Omani involvement in this intra-Hadhrami dispute. In the s, the British assistant adviser P S Allfree found himself caught in a dispute over the town of Habrut, which lies along the frontier between Oman and Mahra.
Alifree allowed the locals to have unfettered access to the dates of Habrut; the question of territorial title was left unresolved 2. This appearance of resolution was, however, to be challenged, for a time, with the rise of the nationalist movements in South Arabia which began in Oman with the Jabal Akhdhar revolt of , and in Yemen with the revolution of September These recurrent upheavals are an important part of the modern history of these states, and of their formation today.
The process by which a modern Yemeni nationalism emerged, encompassing North and South, Aden and the Protectorates, and, gradually and never conclusively, Hadhramaut and Mahra lies outside the scope of this lecture. Suffice it to say that, by the s and amidst political turmoil in North and South, the idea of a single modern Yemen, corresponding to the territory of both North and South, had gained considerable ground.
The boundaries of thisYemen, and of its two component parts, were, however, not always clear: this was most noticeable in regard to the Saudi-Yemeni border dispute. In regard to Oman, Yemeni nationalism was less concerned, and the general issue of their border has never featured as a significant issue in modern Yemeni politics.
Yemeni claims on territory have focused mainly on Saudi Arabia. Here there have been clashes, as there were, in , with Eritrea over the Hanish Islands. Yet this uncertainty about the Yemeni-Saudi frontier has implications, as we shall see, for Oman. In the period immediately after the independence of South Yemen in , some NLF officials in Hadhramaut, acting, so far as I have been able to discern, off their own bat, did lay claim to Dhofar as part of historic Yemen, but this was never sustained or pursued. Of greater import was the officialYemeni protest at the decision of the retiring British authorities to transfer administrative authority for the Kuria Muria islands to Muscat: these had been given as a present to Queen Victoria by Sultan Said in and subsequently run by the Persian Gulf administration.
The inhabitants had, so Britain reported, opted to be part of Oman rather than South Yemen. What was not dropped and was intermittently raised in the ensuing years by PDRY officials was the claim to around 7, square kilometres allegedly transferred from Mahra to Oman in by the British Political Agent in alGheidha: in the overall catalogue of Yemeni-Omani disagreements this did not, however, rank very highly.
Here we come to the most conflictual, and controversial, chapter in the modern history of Yemeni-Omani relations, the period associated with the war in Dhofar between and and the South Yemeni support for this 3. These groups, originally of a Nasserist orientation, were radicalised by the Egyptian defeat by Israel in and by developments in the Yemen war. The result was that the government in Aden was now run by the ideological associates of the Dhofari rebels.
They believed, in addition to any strategic interest they might have had, that they had an ideological duty to assist their fellow revolutionaries in Dhofar. Assistance consisted first of rifles, military facilities and training, as well as diplomatic and financial support. Yemeni troops also guarded the frontier and on occasions, particularly in clashes at Habrut in May and in artillery clashes during the last months of the war in late , became involved in cross-border activities.
It is an open question how far the Aden government actually controlled the Dhofar guerrillas or approved of all that they did. Any policy they had was increasingly affected by that of other powers with an interest in Dhofar, first up to the Chinese and then the USSR.
Yet as long as the war in Dhofar continued, Aden was in collision with Oman, not only along the frontier, but also in the diplomatic arena. In when Oman sought entry to the Arab League and to the UN, South Yemen sought to organise opposition to its entry: but this was unsuccessful. It was to take another eleven years for Aden and Muscat to reach agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations: even after the defeat of the guerrillas in late , and the coming into operation of an effective ceasefire in March , the PDRY continued to impose demands on normalisation of relations.
There matters rested until in the two Yemens, for reasons unconnected to Oman, merged into one state. The stages by whichYemen as a whole and Oman have been brought closer in the s can be briefly summarised. North Yemen had maintained, ever since the emergence of Oman as a modern Arab state in , relations with Muscat and had a common interest in containing the PDRY Indeed the security threat posed, directly and indirectly to the North was far greater than any ever posed to Muscat.
In the border agreement was signed between the two states, and in May a new border post at al-Mazyouna was opened.
The issue of homosexuality is widely taboo in the Middle East, including Yemen where the penalty for being gay can be severe. Despite such. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender (LGBT) persons in Yemen face legal challenges not The law stipulates that married men convicted of homosexuality are to be put to death. Article of the Saudi Arabian-led intervention · Saudi-led blockade · Famine in Yemen (–present) · Taiz campaign (–present).
This is expected to be completed next year. But things were not at first that simple.
The Yemeni unity agreement of May , while it created one government, allowed two states to remain in existence. The inter-Yemeni war of lasted for seventy days, at the end of which the forces of the North occupied Aden and, rapidly, the whole of the South. This meant that for the first time in modern history forces from the Yemeni heartland had reached the frontiers of Omani jurisdiction. The war of presented Oman with two immediate problems. One was its attitude during the war itself.
Others, notably Qatar, supported the North. Oman did not sway either way and avoided, as it had done in , conflict across its borders. That said, there were some Yemeni emigres in Oman who did provide logistical and other support to the South and, in contrast to , when the defeated forces crossed into North Yemen, on this occasion the losers in the South crossed into Oman. Most of the military who came over subsequently returned, but the President of the breakaway republic, Ali al-Bidh, who sought refuge with his family, remains. Al-Bidh is, however, in a state of political silence, and it may well be that Yemen is happy for him to remain there under such conditions.
The second problem which Oman faced was what attitude to take to the new united Yemen. There may have been some anxiety at first, if only because Oman had got used to working with the southern officials and was now confronted with forces it knew less well. But this was a temporary concern, and in time relations were consolidated.
The core of this new understanding is the border agreement signed between the two countries on 1 October This delimited the border, whilst two appendices dealt, respectively, with the organisation of the border authorities, and the use of water, grazing and movement in the border zone, this latter being defined as a zone running up to a maximum of 25 kilometres each way from the common boundary line.
They have a rationale, serve a social purpose and do not violate fairness or the spirit of cooperation. It is more dangerous to report in the United States now. One and a half million people were displaced. In a nutshell, the core idea behind commercial and investment banking, that of financial interemediation, was retained but the ethically repugnant practice of interest on loans was discarded. Orangorang Ottoman hanya menyebutkannya sebagai metode akuntansi. Jika ingin maju, pers sudah selayaknya dibangun dengan mutu jurnalistik yang tinggi, dan ini hanya dapat dihasilkan oleh tenagatenaga profesional yang memiliki semangat dan dedikasi yang tinggi pula. Even if the Supreme Court does not require it, the case for parliamentary approval before invoking Article 50 remains.
A subsequent agreement covered the clearing of mines left from the time of the Dhofar war. Final border maps were exchanged in June 5. There was some controversy in Yemen over rumours that the government was giving away territory to Oman, and Omani officials for their part took pains to explain the agreement to the tribes who lived along the frontier. But as far as the domestic opinion of both countries is concerned this agreement prompted far less controversy than many other such issues in the Peninsula and the Middle East as a whole.
When we come to the present, we can recognise that, for all their differences Yemen and Oman have many similarities. They are countries which combine a rich internal diversity, with an openness to the outside world. Both have created a national heritage that draws on diverse aspects of their past. This diversity can be a source of strength not of weakness. InYemen there are differences of religious sect, between Zeidi and Shafei, and of region, stretching from the northern highlands to Hadhramaut.
Oman for its part has a religious diversity, comprising Ibadhis, who are neither Sunni nor Shia, with Sunni and Shia minorities. Oman also has its geographical diversity, from the Batina coast to the mountains of the interior down to Dhofar. The challenge of development is, in both cases, to preserve this diversity whilst forging a modern state.
In Yemen, the Horn of Africa is a small distance away — Yemen gave Ethiopia its script — and the migrations of the past two centuries have produced a diaspora that stretches through much of the Indian Ocean and on, including to the cities of Britain. There is one further element that they both share, and which has been well illustrated in recent history, and that is a remarkable ability to overcome internal differences. The history of both countries in modern times is one of recurrent upheaval and revolt. Under the Imams there was considerable resistance, most notably in the revolt of the Free Yemenis of , before the Hamid al-Din succumbed in September to the revolt of Sallal and the other officers.
Eight years of civil war followed. The history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has also been one of uprising and challenge: as far as the interior of the north is concerned, in the s, in the period and then in the s, and then, later, in the separate revolt in Dhofar from Yet after each of these, including the more recent and ideological confrontations, a measure of resolution and conciliation occurred; there was no large-scale and enduring retribution, but rather an attempt to forge a new, national, consensus.
This is something remarkable in any comparative perspective and something which marks South Arabia off from those European and other countries — one thinks of Ireland and Finland in the s, Spain in the s, or Greece in the s, let alone the USA after the s or China after — where civil war was followed by decades of division and recrimination. This is something which the two countries share, and it is something that I was struck by during my recent visit to Oman. Some opponents have taken their case to the constitutional court, arguing that the amnesty amounts to legalised money-laundering.
But with commodity prices low and plans aplenty for big spending on infrastructure, the government believes it will help. Diane James, committed Leaver. Yet in her 18 days in charge she unveiled no new policies and avoided giving interviews—though she did confirm to a journalist that Vladimir Putin was one of her political heroes. On October 4th she quit, complaining that she lacked the support of her colleagues. Nigel Farage will once again head the party before handing over to a new leader.