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Add to Cart. Rent on DeepDyve. Log in. Email Please enter a valid Username. Password Please enter your Password. Forgot your password? Article information. Published Online: Published in Print: Cited By. It remains to be seen whether the party will be able to recover from this split. In general, however, these parties are considered moderate conservatives by their counterparts in Western Europe, 42 even though some of the most prominent activists of radical right groups are members of these parties.
While political parties try to adapt to the changing political context, and to transform themselves into moderate political organizations in order to escape political marginalization, radical right non-party groups usually do not think of such compromises. They openly express their fascism, racism, anti-Semitism, etc.
With the retreat of formerly strong radical ultra-nationalist parties, these groups have become increasingly visible and deserve a closer look. The beginnings of non-party neo-fascist organizations in the former Yugoslavia are usually traced back to the early skinhead groups in the second half of the s.
At the same time, the fact that many of the groups dealt with in this article draw on a certain fascist tradition from the period of the Second World War, almost invites us to call a spade a spade and speak of neo-fascism. The eventful seven days filled with LGBT arts, culture, and sports events. The social consequences of these developments—increasing poverty, unemployment, corruption, etc. Open Access for Librarians. Oppressed gay people are prone to auto-homophobia. Due to the emergence of another clerical fascist group , in and Obraz was forced to change its strategy.
Neo-Nazi skinheads emerged in larger Yugoslav cities in various ways. In some cities, the right-wing skinheads were only a small fraction, left over after the political break-up within the scene, the majority of whom formed SHARP groups. Here, all skinheads were soon identified with neo-Nazis, although the majority of young men identifying themselves with the skinhead culture could be described as politically undifferentiated.
In these cities, it was only in the course of the s that smaller SHARP groups were formed, distancing themselves from the right-wing skinheads. Large parts of a sizeable underground scene centered on various musical genres and bands, adopted radical right ideas. However, these were exceptions, and mostly at an individual level.
The first Yugoslav neo-fascists or neo-Nazis were recruited among football fans, perhaps even more than among the fans of underground music. During the last twenty years, the scene changed in such a way that all major football clubs now have neo-fascist fan groups in their stadiums.
These groups openly use racist, anti-Semitic, or just old-school Nazi slogans and symbols Celtic crosses and swastikas, and combinations of numerical symbols, like 18 Most often, however, the slogans draw on a local nationalist context. In Croatia, the situation is quite similar: Here, too, fascism has penetrated the fan groups of all the major clubs, like Dinamo Zagreb , Hajduk Split , Rijeka , etc.
It was only in the last couple of years that special laws prohibiting and sanctioning this kind of violence were adopted in several countries in the region. Apart from attempts to organize and perform several protest marches, the public presence of these groups is usually restricted to brutal attacks on anti-fascist activists, Roma, and other minorities.
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Their ideology—which is shared by the post-Yugoslav activists—is based on white supremacy as it is known throughout Europe. An interesting feature of these groups is that they include both transnational organized radical right networks and autochthonous groups. It has only a few members and basically propagates racism, embedding it in an obscure quasi-medieval iconography, while remaining strictly pagan.
Its political influence even within the right-wing circles is rather marginal. Of much stronger influence was the forming of Nacionalni stroj [National Order] 57 in Serbia. This militant neo-Nazi group was established in February as a result of a conflict within the neo-Nazi community in Serbia. The group that was to become Nacionalni stroj accused the rest of being too soft, and started to spray anti-Semitic and racist graffiti in Belgrade. The police intervention and the official statements issued by the organizers eventually led to more public attention being paid to this group, as well as to the prosecution of its members.
In June , he moved to Germany. He was finally arrested in February in the Bavarian city of Traunstein. Since Nacionalni stroj had recently been prohibited, its members started using Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a new area for their actions, as did other clerical fascist organizations from Serbia.
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Following the developments and strategies of their German colleagues, the neo-Nazis gathered around this group. Despite common actions and mutual sympathy between the transnationally organized neo-Nazi groups and clerical fascists, the latter should be mentioned separately.
They emerged from the aforementioned local radical right intellectual circles in Serbia, who have propagated nationalism since the mids and advocate a specific form of aggressive clerical nationalism. Obraz was founded in by radical right intellectuals and students at Belgrade University.
In this period, another organization that was close to Obraz , Sv. This group was intended to be the student sub-organization of Obraz , but this idea was dropped, and the organization did not really gain any serious political influence, except among some of the students of the Faculty of Philosophy. The group mobilized for the Cyrillic alphabet, stating that it is crucial for the Serbs to maintain their own alphabet. They also mobilized on the topic of Kosovo, urging the stronger involvement of the army in this issue.
Due to the emergence of another clerical fascist group , in and Obraz was forced to change its strategy. In terms of international allies, Obraz has close contact with the Russkii Obraz organization in Russia, and is well connected to various organizations of the new right in Romania, Slovakia, Poland, France, and Italy. Like Obraz , the group Dveri srpske: Srpski sabor Dveri. National organization of free people] underwent a similar development. The organization emerged around the Dveri srpske magazine and was founded in January Besides publishing the magazine and books with clerical and nationalist content, the organization organized several public debates in various parts of Serbia.
Recent actions include a sort of pro-life campaign, arguing that the Serbian people are dying out. The organization also tries to mobilize nationalist Serbs abroad. It is close to the Serbian Orthodox Church and serves as a forum for nationalist intellectuals. Dveri recently succeeded in registering itself as a political party. It won over 4 percent of the votes in the last parliamentary elections in Serbia, 67 and although it did not gain any seats, it exhibited quite a strong mobilizing potential, bearing in mind the short life of the party.
Internal conflicts apparently split the alliance, 68 although there are no details about it to be found on their homepages. Both groups are based on the idea of clericalism and ultra-nationalism. Both organizations are well connected to various radical right organizations abroad, especially in Russia. The early activities of both groups were restricted to propagandistic actions like distributing posters, flyers, etc. Whether this attempt will be successful, has to be seen. In terms of political influence, this organization remains marginal.
How strong it may grow remains to be seen, but its ability to cooperate with other political organizations, as well as its growing infrastructure, could make it a serious new protagonist on the Serbian neo-fascist scene.
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For the time being, Dveri seems to be filling the gap left by the absence of a strong clerical fascist party in Serbia. Despite the political focus of the autochthonous clerical fascist groups on Serbia and its internal politics, these groups also try to act transnationally. Like most other neo-fascist groups, all clerical fascist groups have attractive websites, even though this combination of tradition and modern means of communication may seem paradoxical. All these groups also use various online forums and, recently, also Facebook groups for communication, also in order to attract new sympathizers.
This form of cross-border activism is far from unusual in this region. Facing a relatively low level of acceptance by the Hungarians in Serbia, the group tries to mobilize young people by organizing cultural events in villages and smaller cities that have a Hungarian majority population. Several concert performances by openly neo-fascist bands from Hungary have already been organized, some of them with public funds provided by the autonomous province of Vojvodina.
Since then, the activities of 64 Counties and its allies have been reduced to a minimum, but it can be expected that new Hungarian fascist initiatives will emerge. A first reorganization of 64 Counties is in sight: A new organization called Magyar remeny mozgalom [Hungarian Hope Movement] seems to be slowly replacing the old organization. Since the political changes in , which are regarded as an important break in the most recent history of the post-Yugoslav area, there have been further transformations of the political context.
The pro-European course of most governments in the region was accompanied by a series of economic reforms, for example the rapid privatization of state-owned companies, which led to serious social consequences, including a growing unemployment rate over 30 percent in Macedonia, almost 30 percent in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and over 20 percent in Serbia and even extreme poverty in some of the post-Yugoslav states.